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Abstract:
Conservation science needs more high-quality impact evaluations, 
especially ones which explore the mechanisms for success or failure. 
Randomized Control Trials (RCTs) provide particularly robust evidence of 
the effectiveness of interventions (although they have been criticized as 
reductionist and unable to provide insights into mechanisms) but there 
have been very few such experiments investigating conservation at the 
landscape scale. We explored the impact of Watershared, an incentive-
based conservation program in the Bolivian Andes, using one of the few 
RCTs of landscape-scale conservation in existence. There is strong 
interest in such incentive-based conservation approaches as some argue 
that they can avoid the negative social impacts sometimes associated 
with protected areas. We focused on social and environmental outcomes, 
using responses from a household survey in 129 communities randomly 
allocated to control or treatment. We controlled for incomplete program 
uptake by combining standard RCT analysis with matching methods, and 
investigated mechanisms by exploring intermediate and ultimate 
outcomes according to the underlying theory of change. Previous 
analyses, focusing on single biophysical outcomes, showed that over its 
first five years Watershared did not slow deforestation or improve water 
quality at the landscape scale. Here we show that it has influenced some 
intermediate outcomes (including targeted production systems and 
perceptions of the condition of forest), while having no impact or 
unexpected impact on other outcomes. By publishing this study as a 
Registered Report we bring an unusual degree of transparency in 
conservation research. We suggest that pre-registration of analysis, 
ideally combined with peer review, is particularly beneficial with complex 
analyses involving multiple outcomes as it avoids the temptation for 
cherry picking and reduces publication bias against negative results. This 
paper also demonstrates how Randomized Control Trials can give 
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2 Exploring mechanisms and impacts of an incentive-based conservation program with evidence from a Randomized 
3 Control Trial
4 Abstract
5 Conservation science needs more high-quality impact evaluations, especially ones which explore the mechanisms 
6 for success or failure. Randomized Control Trials (RCTs) provide particularly robust evidence of the effectiveness of 
7 interventions (although they have been criticized as reductionist and unable to provide insights into mechanisms) 
8 but there have been very few such experiments investigating conservation at the landscape scale. We explored 
9 the impact of Watershared, an incentive-based conservation program in the Bolivian Andes, using one of the few 
10 RCTs of landscape-scale conservation in existence. There is strong interest in such incentive-based conservation 
11 approaches as some argue that they can avoid the negative social impacts sometimes associated with protected 
12 areas. We focused on social and environmental outcomes, using responses from a household survey in 129 
13 communities randomly allocated to control or treatment. We controlled for incomplete program uptake by 
14 combining standard RCT analysis with matching methods, and investigated mechanisms by exploring intermediate 
15 and ultimate outcomes according to the underlying theory of change. Previous analyses, focusing on single 
16 biophysical outcomes, showed that over its first five years Watershared did not slow deforestation or improve 
17 water quality at the landscape scale. Here we show that it has influenced some intermediate outcomes (including 
18 targeted production systems and perceptions of the condition of forest), while having no impact or unexpected 
19 impact on other outcomes. By publishing this study as a Registered Report we bring an unusual degree of 
20 transparency in conservation research. We suggest that pre-registration of analysis, ideally combined with peer 
21 review, is particularly beneficial with complex analyses involving multiple outcomes as it avoids the temptation 
22 for cherry picking and reduces publication bias against negative results. This paper also demonstrates how 
23 Randomized Control Trials can give insights into the pathways of impact, as well as whether an intervention has 
24 impact.
25




27 There is considerable interest in using positive incentives to encourage sustainable land management, conserve 
28 forests, and protect biodiversity. Those promoting these incentive-based conservation approaches, which include 
29 payments for ecosystem services (PES) (Jack et al. 2008), suggest they can both effectively deliver environmental 
30 outcomes and result in better social outcomes than strict protected areas (Sims & Alix-Garcia 2017). Synthesis of the 
31 existing evidence base suggests PES-type interventions have, if anything, only a modest impact on environmental 
32 outcomes, and impacts on social outcomes are even more uncertain (Liu & Kontoleon, 2018; Samii et al. 2014). More 
33 and better quality evaluations are needed, especially those which can cast light on the mechanisms by which 
34 outcomes are, or are not, delivered (Miteva et al. 2012; Börner et al. 2016, 2017).
35 Randomized control trials (RCT) randomly allocate experimental units to treatment and control groups and are 
36 therefore often considered to provide particularly robust evidence of the effectiveness of interventions (Ferraro 
37 2009). However, in the context of conservation policies, RCTs are rare (Pynegar et al. 2019). To our knowledge there 
38 have been two RCTs of incentive-based conservation interventions implemented at scale. Jayachandran et al. (2017) 
39 showed that carbon payments slowed deforestation rates in Uganda. The RCT in Bolivia of the Watershared 
40 intervention (Bottazzi et al. 2018) has been used to evaluate the impact of incentivizing farmers to keep cattle out of 
41 riparian forest and reduce deforestation on water quality (Pynegar et al. 2018), deforestation rates (Wiik et al. 2019), 
42 and environmental values (Grillos et al. 2019). A third landscape-scale RCT in conservation explored the impact of 
43 unconditional livelihood payments on deforestation rates in Sierra Leone (Wilebore et al. 2019).
44 Evaluation of such socioecological interventions is inherently complex because whether or not the incentives and 
45 associated social processes will produce the desired land-use change is uncertain and, even if achieved, these land 
46 use changes may (or may not) result in the desired social and environmental ultimate outcome. Impacts may also 
47 differ between strata of society (Daw et al., 2016) and take time to materialize. There is interest in other disciplines, 
48 such as public health, in bringing lessons from qualitative impact evaluation into Randomized Control Trial analysis 
49 (Bonell et al. 2012). In qualitative impact evaluation, the focus is on building and validating a theory of change (which 
50 identifies the mechanisms by which the intervention delivers intermediate and ultimate outcomes of interest; White 
51 2009) rather than a narrow focus on ultimate outcomes. The existing published papers which use an RCT to evaluate 
52 the impact of landscape-scale conservation interventions mostly report ultimate environmental outcomes of the 
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53 intervention (e.g. deforestation rates) but say little about social outcomes (and how these might differ between 
54 different groups), and the causal linkages between the intervention and intermediate and ultimate outcomes. 
55 The Bolivian organization Natura Bolivia began to develop the incentive-based conservation program now known as 
56 Watershared in 2003 (Asquith & Vargas 2007). Watershared aims to establish a reciprocal relationship between 
57 environmental service users (municipal governments, and water cooperatives) and services providers (upstream 
58 farmers and cattle-owners) by using in-kind incentives for forest protection and exclusion of cattle from riparian 
59 forest to protect biodiversity and improve downstream water quality (Bottazzi et al. 2018). As of 2016, Watershared 
60 had 210,000 hectares (4500 households) under conservation agreements (Asquith 2016). We use the Watershared 
61 Randomized Control Trial as a rare opportunity to fully analyze the impacts of an incentive-based conservation 
62 program. The RCT includes 129 communities randomly allocated to treatment (households were offered 
63 Watershared agreements) or control (households were not offered agreements). Using a large household survey 
64 conducted at baseline (in 2010) and endline (in 2015/16) we explore both intermediate outcomes (e.g. perceived 
65 importance of forest, livelihood changes such as cattle exclusion from riparian forest) and indicators of ultimate 
66 outcomes (e.g. perceived forest condition, incidence and frequency of diarrhea). We use the theory of change 
67 underpinning the intervention to structure the evaluation. This paper is submitted as a registered report (Parker et 
68 al. 2019).
69 Methods
70 Watershared Randomized Control Trial
71 In 2010, Natura decided to roll out Watershared in a new protected area (Area Natural de Manejo Integrado Río 
72 Grande y Valles Cruceños) as a randomized control trial (Fig. 1) to evaluate the impact of the intervention on 
73 deforestation rates, the quality and quantity of water available for local communities, environmental values, and 
74 local livelihoods. They selected the 129 communities in the five main municipalities overlapping the protected area, 
75 and these were randomly allocated to control (conservation agreements not offered) or treatment (agreements 
76 offered) subsequent to blocking by municipality, community size, and cattle numbers. Consent to conduct the trial 
77 was granted by municipal mayors on the understanding that the program would subsequently be implemented in all 
78 communities. The experiment was not blinded because participants unavoidably knew whether they belonged to a 
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79 control or treatment community. In 2016 the experiment ended, and agreements were offered in control 
80 communities.
81 The Watershared intervention operates through combining incentives with environmental education; a key feature 
82 of the intervention is promoting the message that watershed protection is in everyone’s interest (Bottazzi et al 
83 2018). Natura gave an environmental education presentation to all treatment and control communities prior to 
84 recruiting treatment participants, so the randomization primarily tested the effect of the incentives. Reinforcement 
85 of the education messages would have occurred more strongly in treatment communities, where there were 
86 multiple visits to offer and monitor the conservation agreements from 2011 to 2015.
87 Watershared agreements 
88 There were three levels of Watershared agreements. Level 1 and 2 agreements applied to forested land within 100m 
89 of a stream or waterway while Level 3 agreements applied to any forested land (details in Bottazzi et al. [2018]). In 
90 all three levels, land clearance or timber extraction were not permitted. In addition, cattle had to be excluded from 
91 land under level 1 agreements (while level 2 required working towards removing cattle). The value of incentive 
92 packages ranged from the equivalent of US$1/ha/year to US$10/ha/year, and farmers with level 1 agreements 
93 received an additional 100 US$ worth of in-kind incentives at signing. Transportation costs of the materials to 
94 communities were covered by the program. Agreements were for an initial 3 years, were renewable, and were 
95 offered in treatment communities twice per year. Program technicians monitored level 1 and level 2 land annually by 
96 walking transects across the parcels to verify compliance; level 3 agreements were monitored using remote sensing 
97 (forest cover). Where blatant noncompliance was detected, the materials that farmers had been given were 
98 removed and redistributed to the community. As with many incentive-based conservation interventions, not all 
99 conservation funded with Watershared agreements is additional (i.e. some would have happened anyway in the 
100 absence of the scheme; a common issue with PES-type programs [Ezzine-de-Blas et al. 2016]). Bottazzi et al. (2018) 
101 estimated that a maximum of 30% of agreements to exclude cattle and 14% to avoid deforestation appear to be 
102 additional.
103 Watershared Household survey
104 The household survey was a structured questionnaire with > 100 questions (Bottazzi et al. 2017). The baseline 
105 household survey was carried out by Natura in 2010 and the endline survey by Natura and Bangor University staff 
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106 between October 2015 and June 2016. The aim was to deliver the baseline household survey to all households in all 
107 communities (Bottazzi et al. 2017). This was mostly achieved; while the baseline reached 2623 households, only 57 
108 previously unsurveyed households were found in the endline survey (Supporting Information 1). However, the 
109 endline was incomplete (S1) because 8 communities did not have any households with data from both baseline and 
110 endline surveys; these were excluded from the analysis (Fig. 1a).
111 Out of all households surveyed in both baseline and endline in treatment communities (n = 970), 456 households 
112 took up Watershared agreements and 514 did not (i.e. 47% uptake). The allocation to control and treatment was not 
113 perfect as 32 out of 702 households in control communities had agreements (Fig. 1b); however, 28 of these 
114 agreements were in land owned in treatment communities. Uptake percentages varied across communities from 0% 
115 to 100%, which in part reflects high percent uptake in a few small communities (Fig. 1b). Uptake of the program was 
116 influenced by barriers to entry (Grillos 2017), individual motivations (Bottazzi et al. 2018), and whether or not 
117 households were available to attend the meetings in which the program was presented (Wiik et al. 2019).
118 The consent form used in both baseline and endline surveys is archived alongside the data (Bottazzi et al. 2017). The 
119 endline survey was assessed under the Bangor University Research Ethics Framework. Natura were involved in the 
120 research (and paid the enumerators), which is a potential conflict of interest because they are also the implementers 
121 of the Watershared program that this work evaluates. However, the independent Bangor University team trained 
122 the enumerators, designed the survey, managed and cleaned the data, and conducted the analysis.
123 Selection of outcome variables
124 There are a large number of potential outcome variables from the survey which could be explored. We 
125 systematically selected outcome variables for analysis based on there being a clear hypothesized mechanism linking 
126 to Watershared objectives (S2), based on the program’s underlying theory of change (see Fig. 2). The outcome 
127 variables selected include intermediate outcomes seen to contribute to the attainment of Watershared ultimate 
128 outcomes (e.g. number of water intakes protected from cattle, perception that forest delivers benefits) and self-
129 reported indicators of the ultimate Watershared outcomes (e.g. diarrheal disease in children, perception in forest 
130 condition). In total, we identified 11 main outcome variables of interest (some of which have more than one 
131 indicator) (Fig. 2).
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132 One outcome had already been evaluated. Pynegar (2018) found no effect of the intervention as implemented on 
133 diarrheal incidence and frequency. We accept this finding and do not reanalyze. However, we conduct a secondary 
134 analysis exploring the impact of the intervention on the subset of households that report having an individual water 
135 intake, which households plausibly have more control over.
136 Four outcomes were analyzed for a subset of households (Fig. 2) rather than the full dataset. Diarrhea frequency and 
137 incidence among children was only analyzed for households that have their own drinking water intake and have 
138 children. Hectares of irrigated land was only analyzed for those who reported having access to irrigation in both 
139 baseline and endline surveys. The extent and method by which water intakes are protected was only analyzed for 
140 those who reported protecting their water intake in the endline survey (there was not a baseline question on this 
141 variable). Hectares of improved grazing land was only analyzed for those who said they owned cattle in baseline and 
142 endline surveys.
143 Data analyses
144 Our data analyses focused on testing, within the theory-of-change framework, the individual hypotheses within the 
145 11 outcome categories of survey questions (Fig. 2). Within each category, we identified one main analysis where we 
146 would expect to see a change driven by the intervention if successful, and in some cases, also secondary analyses 
147 where changes may either be premature to detect, or indicative more of a detail within a process than an 
148 overarching mechanism or success of Watershared (Fig. 2). In our analyses, we followed a hierarchy by which the 
149 main analysis within a category was given most weight in evaluating the program (e.g. whether intakes are protected 
150 more or less in treatment communities, is more important than when intakes were protected). The results from all 
151 analyses were evaluated against the theory-of-change logic. Where results conflict with this logic, we evaluated the 
152 strength of evidence based on robustness checks. If results were robust, this casts doubt on the theory of change.
153 We tested our hypotheses using two analytical approaches; one estimated the average treatment effect  
154 (Glennerster & Takavarasha, 2013) of the program as it was rolled out, and the other estimated the program effect 
155 specifically on those who  participated (Fig. 3). The first, As-Randomized analysis, compared outcomes in all 
156 households in treatment communities with all households in control communities, regardless of uptake. The second, 
157 As-Treated analysis, compared outcomes in Treated households (households in treatment communities who 
158 participated, regardless of which incentives they selected [Supporting Information]) with statistically matched 
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159 Control households (matched Control = households in control communities likely to have participated, had they had 
160 the opportunity, excluding those who signed agreements). The distinction between the As-Randomized and As-
161 Treated analyses is important due to the incomplete uptake of Watershared. For example, overall impacts of 
162 interventions may be low not because the intervention lacks efficacy but instead because of low levels of uptake or 
163 poor implementation and compliance (Glennerster & Takavarasha 2013).
164 Some of our perception-based variables represent an observation of community-wide change and so blur the 
165 distinction between As-Randomized and As-Treated analyses (e.g., a perception of how the community is managing 
166 its forest can be the same for a participating and non-participating household). In these cases, the difference 
167 between the As-Randomized and As-Treated analyses tests whether participation in the program changes how a 
168 person perceives their environment.
169 Before stage 1 review of this registered report we completed three phases of data preprocessing (Fig. 3). Phase I 
170 involved choosing variables for use in matching (in the As-Treated analyses) and for use as control variables in the 
171 final outcome regressions (both analyses). We selected variables that we hypothesized to influence both uptake and 
172 outcomes of the program. Candidate variables were considered based on previous work exploring the uptake of the 
173 Watershared intervention (Grillos 2017; Bottazzi et al. 2018; Wiik et al. 2019). We avoided variables with a lot of 
174 missing data (S4). The final set included variables capturing community cohesion, wealth, education, and 
175 predisposing environmental attitudes (Table 1). Baseline data for an outcome, where available, were used as control 
176 variables in outcome regressions as per some difference-in-differences analyses, but not as matching variables to 
177 avoid regression to the mean (Daw & Hatfield 2018) (S4). In phase II (S5), we developed propensity score models, 
178 based on the variables selected, to predict selection bias for households in control communities based on modeled 
179 participation in the program among households in treatment communities. In phase III (S6), we used the selected 
180 variables and the propensity scores (a primary and secondary version) to match Treated households with the best 
181 available counterfactuals from the control households through a genetic matching algorithm. We used the R 
182 packages Matching (Sekhon 2011) to perform the matching, cobalt (Greifer 2019) to evaluate balance visually, mgcv 
183 for regressions (Wood 2011, 2017), and ggplot2 for plots (Wickham 2016).
184 The final two phases (outcome regressions; phase IV, and robustness checks; phase V) were carried out after stage I 
185 review was complete. Since we tested many outcomes, there was an increased probability of encountering at least 
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186 one false positive (finding a significant impact on an outcome when there is, in fact, none). We therefore applied the 
187 Benjamini Hochberg (1995) method to control the false detection rate (FDR) at a level of 0.05, ranking p values based 
188 on the p value from the primary analysis within outcome categories (Fig. 2; also see S8 for full description of the 
189 multiple testing procedures). These methods were reviewed as part of our stage 1 plan.
190 The regressions used for hypothesis testing (as opposed to robustness checks) were those that included the primary 
191 propensity score (S5, S6) and, in the case of matched analyses, the regressions run on the least restrictive caliper 
192 while still attaining adequate balance (a caliper limits the difference between any one pair of observations to within 
193 a given standard deviation, meaning that Treated observations deemed too different from any one Control were 
194 discarded) (S5). Regressions including the secondary propensity score and additional matching outputs were used as 
195 robustness checks (S6, S7) as per recommended best practice (Ho et al. 2007). For example, we would not expect 
196 robust results to be changed by using a slightly different set of Control observations, or a subset of Treated 
197 households (where a caliper results in losing Treated households).
198 In the As-Randomized analyses (Phase IV), the outcome was regressed on the experimental group (control or 
199 treatment) plus control variables, including the baseline data for an outcome where available. Our control variables 
200 included those used in matching to control for non-independence of observations (Wan 2019), add precision to our 
201 effect estimate, correct for remaining biases (Ho et al. 2007; Hill 2008; Streiner 2015), and allow evaluation of 
202 heterogeneous treatment effects based on variable interactions (Ferraro & Hanauer 2014). All regressions were 
203 undertaken using generalized additive models (GAMs) (Wood 2017); families were fitted to the response expectation 
204 (e.g. the binomial family with a logit link for binary outcomes; S8). 
205 As-Treated regressions were similar except for being undertaken on the matched Control and Treated subsets of 
206 data as per the matching protocol. The protocol resulted in four possible datasets: the combinations of 1) matching 
207 with and without a caliper; and 2) matching with two versions of the propensity score (S6). For the outcomes that 
208 were analyzed with the full data set (Fig. 2), we tested all four datasets in four regressions. For the outcomes only 
209 appropriate to explore with a smaller subset of data (e.g. those who own cattle, or have children, Fig. 2), we ran only 
210 two regressions because applying a caliper resulted in losing too many Treated observations (S6). 
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211 To explore the extent to which the intervention may benefit socio-economic groups differently and our expectation 
212 that some outcomes may be more feasible to achieve for some households than others, we explored a number of 
213 outcome interactions based on education and wealth indicators (Table 1). We also included an interaction between 
214 perception of water quantity or quality and the experimental group (control or treatment or matched Control or 
215 Treated) to examine whether the program had different impacts on those who are more influenced by these issues 
216 (Table 1).
217 Deviations from pre-registration
218 We opted to undertake all outcome analysis using truncated values of highly skewed predictors, contrary to what 
219 was stated in the Supplementary Information of Stage 1. This was because we felt this added an unnecessary 
220 complication (testing whether outliers were biasing our estimates for each of 98 individual models).
221 Results
222 Checks suggest that results are robust as there are no inconsistencies in the direction of effects for any models (SI 9). 
223 Robustness checks also confirmed the significance (or lack of) of the main analysis for As-Randomized analyses. 
224 There is slightly less agreement in the significance for As-Treated results (Fig. 4). This may be because power is 
225 reduced in As-Treated results due to lower sample sizes. 
226 When presenting results, we talk both about Treated households and Treatment households. Treated households 
227 are those in treatment communities which signed Watershared agreement. They are always compared against a 
228 counterfactual of households in control communities matched on socio-economic predictors of uptake of 
229 Watershared agreements. These results are those from the As-Treated analysis. Treatment households are all those 
230 in treatment communities. They are always compared against households in control communities (without 
231 matching). These results derive from the As-Randomized analysis. 
232 For some outcomes there were significant treatment effects in the direction hypothesized (Fig. 2, 5, Fig. SI 9). 
233 Treated households and Treatment households had significantly more small fruit trees (a mean of 50 and 25 
234 respectively), and more fruit trees in production (mean of 100 and 150, respectively), than their counterfactuals. 
235 Treated and Treatment households were also more likely to perceive positive trends over the last 5 years in water 
236 quantity and forest condition. They also were more likely to perceive that the wider community care more about the 
237 forest (Fig. 2, 5, Fig. SI 9). The intervention may also have had an effect of increasing the area of improved grazing 
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238 land; while the results of the main model were not significant following p value correction, the models used in the 
239 robustness checks did show a significant effect (Fig. 2, 4, Fig. SI 9). 
240 We did not find evidence of a treatment effect on whether or not a household perceives gaining benefits from forest 
241 (Fig 2, 5, Fig. SI 9). However, given that the vast majority (over 90% in all groups) of respondents perceived benefits 
242 at baseline, there was little scope for increase. Nor were there treatment effects on irrigation access or irrigated land 
243 extent or perceptions of changes in water quality over time. 
244 There was no convincing treatment effect (i.e. effects were not significant after p value correction) on whether 
245 intakes were protected from cattle, or the strength of protection of main water intakes from cattle access (Fig.2, 4). 
246 However, our analyses on the nature of intake protection suggest that Treated and Treatment households were 
247 more likely to use barbed wire than traditional methods to protect intakes, and to have protected intakes more 
248 recently than their counterfactuals. 
249 For some outcomes there were significant treatment effects in the opposite direction to our hypotheses. At endline, 
250 control respondents were about 20% more likely to be members of water committees than Treated or Treatment 
251 households (Fig. 2, 5). There was weaker evidence of a treatment effect against hypothesis for outcomes associated 
252 with diarrhea. The frequency of diarrhea was higher in treatment groups in both analyses (although the effect was 
253 not significant in robustness checks in the As-Treated analysis; Fig. 2, 4). There was also some evidence that 
254 incidence of diarrhea was higher in the Treatment group (although this was not significant after p-value correction 
255 and the effect was not seen in the As-Treated analysis). This result may be an artefact of subsample bias or a lack of 
256 power in this subgroup. The diarrhea analysis was conducted on a small subset of the data (only those households 
257 with children and their own water intake). In the As-Randomized analysis, only 7 incidents of diarrhea were reported 
258 in the control group (N = 61); this was further reduced after matching in the As-Treated analyses. It followed that in 
259 some models there was perfect separation. 
260 Discussion
261 Data analysis involves multiple decisions as researchers seek to reveal the truth from complex, often messy, data 
262 (Fraser et al. 2018). Studies revealing the lack of reproducibility in fields such as pre-clinical medicine (Freedman et 
263 al. 2015) and psychology (Open Science Collaboration 2015) have resulted in much needed scrutiny of how these 
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264 decisions are vulnerable to confusion, or even corruption. While conservation science has so far avoided a scandal of 
265 reproducibility, a recent study of researchers in ecology and evolution (Fraser et al. 2018) revealed a worrying 
266 prevalence of cherry picking (failing to report results which are not significant), or reporting unexpected findings as if 
267 they were hypothesized from the start (Hypothesizing After Results Are Known; HARKing). Pre-registration of 
268 analysis can avoid these problems as long as the study is adequately powered to detect differences of interest. 
269 Submitting planned research for peer review as a registered report goes one step further and also reduces 
270 publication bias (Parker et al. 2019). The multiple outcomes available for analysis from the Watershared RCT were 
271 inevitably vulnerable to cherry-picking and HARKing. By publishing this as a registered report, we reduced both the 
272 temptation to use, and the impression we may have used, questionable research practices to tell a better story. 
273 Ideally, of course, pre-registration should precede data collection. Data collection for this RCT began in 2010 and was 
274 complete in 2015, before pre-registrati n was widely advocated. However we submitted Stage 1 before looking at 
275 any outcome variables meaning the study was accepted in principle based on the introduction and methods alone. 
276 This study is one of the first registered reports in conservation science. 
277 While large-scale RCTs of interventions are receiving increasing attention (for example the 2019 economics Nobel 
278 prize was awarded to Kremer, Banerjee and Duflo for their experimental work on alleviating poverty), they remain 
279 rare in conservation (Pynegar et al. 2019). Our paper is the first we know of which uses a Randomized Control Trial 
280 to look at outcomes from across the theory of change to give insights into the mechanism by which a conservation 
281 intervention works, or does not work. Watershared ultimate aims are to reduce the rate of forest clearance and 
282 degradation, improve livelihoods, and improve water quality and quantity. Our previous analyses of the intervention, 
283 looking simply at biophysical measures of ultimate outcomes, revealed minimal impact on deforestation (Wiik et al. 
284 2019) and water quality (Pynegar et al. 2018). Those analyses alone say little about why the intervention may not 
285 have resulted in a change in those outcomes, or whether measurable impact might be detected given time. Looking 
286 closely at intermediate outcomes, as we do in this paper, provides valuable insights to answer such questions about 
287 mechanisms. 
288 Watershared aims to conserve forest by increasing the awareness of the benefits forests provide and increasing 
289 farmers’ investment in improved grazing (reducing forest grazing) and alternatives to cattle ranching (such as fruit 
290 production). Over 90% of respondents already perceived benefits from forests, so it is unsurprising that the 
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291 intervention did not increase this. The intervention appears to have increased the area of improved grazing, and also 
292 significantly increased fruit tree production (although this was not yet apparent in market values, which we 
293 predicted owing to lags in fruit tree maturation). Watershared also provided cement and irrigation tubing to increase 
294 irrigated agriculture. However, due to their relatively high cost, they were less popular than barbed wire and fruit 
295 trees (and field observations suggest these materials were often used to improve drinking water systems).  It is 
296 therefore unsurprising that the program had no significant impact on irrigation capacity. Previous remote-sensing 
297 analysis of forest area showed no landscape-scale impact of Watershared on deforestation (Wiik et al. 2019 ). 
298 However, our results suggest that the intervention is having an impact on some relevant intermediate outcomes. 
299 The program’s theory of change may thus be correct, but it is perhaps still too early to detect ultimate impacts.
300 Watershared aims to improve water quality by encouraging people to keep cattle out of rivers by providing barbed 
301 wire, and materials to build cattle drinking troughs. While there was no evidence of the intervention increasing the 
302 number of water intakes protected from cattle nor cattle drinking points separated from rivers (p < 0.05), Treated 
303 and Treatment households were more likely to use barbed wire to protect water intakes and to have done this more 
304 recently, suggesting that more intakes might have been protected at baseline in control communities (we lack data 
305 on this; however it would be surprising to invest in protecting intakes already protected). Regardless of a potential 
306 baseline imbalance, it is clear that water quality-related outcomes did not materialize. The lower membership of 
307 water committees in treatment than control groups may have been because households perceived issues with water 
308 quality had been dealt with by the intervention (but this deserves further investigation).  
309 It is interesting that the As-Treated and As-Randomized analyses gave quite similar results. This suggests that 
310 identified effects of Watershared were felt by the wider population in treated communities and not just those who 
311 entered agreements. This is not surprising given that several outcomes either related to outcomes independent of 
312 individual actors (such as perceptions of the wider environment), or related to shared resources (such as water 
313 intakes).  
314 One of the key challenges in conservation impact evaluations is dealing with spillovers (Baylis et al. 2016). When 
315 benefits of a program flow from treatment to control communities (through biophysical or social processes), the 
316 measured difference in outcomes of interest between the groups is reduced, making an impacts of the intervention 
317 harder to detect. Accepting the risk of such spillover is inherent to any study such as ours, which treats communities 
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318 within a continuous social-ecological system as randomization units; however, as spillovers make it harder to detect 
319 an intervention effect, we believe that our identification of significant effects is conservative.
320 Overall, we show that the Watershared intervention has changed land use practices and environmental perceptions. 
321 Following the theory of change, it seems plausible that some ultimate outcomes may yet materialise. However the 
322 impact of the intervention would likely have been enhanced with spatial targeting (Pynegar et al. 2018), increased 
323 technical support, and higher additionality (Bottazzi et al. 2018).
324 Given the importance of improving the effectiveness of conservation interventions, especially those which aim to 
325 deliver better social outcomes alongside environmental benefits (Sims & Alix-Garcia 2017), more robust evaluations 
326 are sorely needed (Snilsveit et al. 2019). While RCTs certainly are not practical or desirable in every situation and 
327 have well understood limitations (Deaton & Cartwright 2018), we show that the criticism that RCTs are inherently 
328 reductionist and cannot give insights into mechanisms is unjustified. By using the Watershared RCT to explore 
329 outcomes from across the intervention’s theory of change we have provided understanding of what is, and is not, 
330 changing on the ground because of the intervention. Such an analysis is inevitably complex. Pre-registration (ideally 
331 alongside a peer review commitment to publish whether the results are positive or negative), is particularly 
332 important in such circumstances. We hope that pre-registration becomes the norm in conservation science, as it is 
333 increasingly so in other applied disciplines. 
334 Supporting Information
335 Household survey coverage (Appendix S1), outcome selection rationale (Appendix S2), definition of Treated 
336 households (Appendix S3), matching variable selection rationale (Appendix S4), propensity score construction and 
337 selection (Appendix S5), matching protocol (Appendix S6), multiple testing adjustment (Appendix S7), outcome 
338 regression details (Appendix S8), outcome regression supplementary results (Appendix S9), and supplementary 
339 literature (Appendix S10) are available online. The authors are solely responsible for the content and functionality of 
340 these materials. Queries should be directed to the corresponding author. 
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444
445 Figure 1: a: Locations of the 64 control communities (Watershared agreements not offered) and 65 treatment 
446 communities (Watershared agreements offered) within the Area Natural de Manejo Integrado Río Grande y Valles 
447 Cruceños protected area. White communities are those for which there are no households with both baseline and 
448 endline data; omitted from our analysis. b: The distribution of the number of households per community (and the 
449 number which took up Watershared agreements) in control (top) and treatment (bottom) communities, ordered by 
450 number of households with agreements.
451




453 Figure 2: The simplified theory of change linking the Watershared intervention with intermediate outcomes (square 
454 boxes), ultimate outcomes (rounded boxes) and indicators of these ultimate outcomes (square boxes with dashed 
455 lines). The hypothesized direction of the effect of the intervention is indicated for each outcome tested in our 
456 analysis. Some analyses are only relevant for a sub-set of data: *: Households who own cattle; +: Households who 
457 have irrigation access; †: Households reporting protected drinking water intakes; ‡: Households with children and 
458 personal water intake. Brackets indicate outcomes for which we expect limited impact (e.g. the number of fruit trees 
459 in production may not yet be affected as they will not yet have had time to reach maturity). The colors show the 
460 results of the regression analyses (for As-Treated models only, Fig. SI 9.3 shows the same results from the As-
461 Randomized models) with green indicating results which support our hypothesis and browns indicating results 
462 against our hypotheses. Less saturated colors show outcomes for where there was some disagreement in the 
463 significance between the models used as robustness checks (Figure 4). 
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464 Figure 3: Outline of methods workflow for the As-Randomized models and As-Treated models. Phases I, II, and III 
465 show pre-processing undertaken for Stage 1 of this registered report (they were completed before initial peer 
466 review). Stages IV and V occurred at Stage 2.




468 Figure 4: Robustness checks based on comparing the significance of intercept differences between control and 
469 treatment groups for the As-Randomized and As-Treated analyses for the primary model and subsidiary models (max 
470 4 in As-Treated due to matching protocols). P-value correction uses the Benjamini-Hochberg threshold (see 
471 Methods). 
472




474 Figure 5: The differences in intercept values (line plots with confidence bars) and interaction slopes (line plots with 
475 confidence bands, where the x axis is a continuous variable) between control and treatment groups for both As-
476 Randomized (AR) and As-Treated (AT) analysis. Only interactions where at least one analysis shows significance are 
Page 23 of 33 Conservation Biology
For review only
23
477 shown. The predictions are based on mean values for continuous predictors, and common values for factor 
478 predictors (e.g., perceiving benefits from forest). 95% confidence intervals relate to the entire prediction, rather than 
479 the control-treatment difference. 
480
481  
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482 Table 1: Variables selected for matching variables and control variables in the final-outcome models, indicating 
483 which will be interacted with the experimental group (treatment or control, or treated or matched control) in 
484 outcome regressions (Stage 2) (NA = Variables not interacted).
Variable Category Mechanism Outcomes for which variable is 






Likely to be related to motivation 
to participate and adhere to 
agreements due to social norms
NA




Likely to be related to level of 
engagement in the community 
and also ability to participate and 
follow through with agreements
NA
Land owned (ha) Wealth
Likely to be related to ability to 
afford to invest time and effort in 
conservation






Likely to be related to owning 
eligible land and being able to 
afford to invest time and effort in 
conservation
NA
Cattle owned (n) Wealth
Likely to be related to ability to 
afford to invest time and effort in 
conservation
Cattle and human drinking water 
management; Improved grazing
Number of rooms 
in home
Wealth
Likely to be related to ability to 
afford to invest time and effort in 
conservation
NA






Likely to be related to capacity to 
engage with the conservation 
program
Cattle and human drinking water 

















Related to motivation to engage 
with conservation
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